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This paper argues that Member States, when regulating their gambling markets, should 
engage in regulatory transparency even in situations where they are not under a duty to 
discharge the obligation of transparency which arises when awarding licences and public 
services concessions. Regulatory competence in this sector rests wholly with the Member 
States and they enjoy a broad margin of discretion in this regard. Yet this should not provide a 
veil for regulatory practices which are incompatible with EU law. Given that regulatory 
opacity typifies this sector regulatory transparency is necessary to ensure that the demands of 
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How best to regulate gambling has long vexed regulatory bodies at all levels of authority. 
Pitting what some perceive as human nature against a total prohibition on all gambling 
activities or allowing some limited degree of gambling so as to safely capture the embodiment 
of human nature have been two of such approaches long before the advent of the internet. 
With the arrival and widespread reach of the internet as a means of cheap and long distance 
communication gambling has been thrust into the international sphere, in both its legal and 
illegal emanations. How best to regulate gambling now vexes those concerned with 
international and transnational trade, in addition to those who grapple with national and 
international dimensions at the national level. It cannot go unnoticed that the very first 
decision to be rendered pursuant to the General Agreement on Trade in Services related to 
internet-based gambling services, where World Trade Organisation member Antigua and 
Barbuda challenged a prohibition of the United States of America against the importation of 
gambling services.
1
 Within the European Union gambling cases have become an increasingly 
frequent topic of discussion within the case-load of the judges of the Court of Justice. Whilst 
the earliest case relied upon the postal system as a means of communication,
2
 then data 
transmission centres acting as local agents for operators established in other Member States,
3
 
the overwhelming bulk of recent preliminary references have undoubtedly been fuelled by 
reliance on the internet to provide gambling services directly to consumers.
4
 This has resulted 
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in tension between those seeking to rely on the free movement principles which underpin the 
internal market and the regulatory competence of each Member State. 
 Internet fuelled clashes between different regulatory approaches to gambling have not 
only been ignited in the international and European contexts, but also within federated 
structures. During the autumn of 2010 the Supreme Court of Washington was called upon to 
determine whether the state wide prohibition on internet gambling in Washington was 
compatible with the dormant commerce clause.
5
 Equally, different Länder in Germany have 
differing views on the regulation of sports-betting and lottery services, with cracks showing 
unanimity of the support of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.
6
  
 This article focuses upon the one aspect of this dynamic within the context of the 
European Union, namely the juxtaposition between regulatory competence and regulatory 
transparency. Deriving from the lack of any harmonisation at the Union level in this field,
7
 
Member States are free to set their own objectives and standards applicable to the regulation 
of all gambling activities within their respective jurisdictions. An integral part of this includes 
the „design‟ of the national gambling market, regardless of whether the same approach is used 
for all sectors or whether a degree of differentiation occurs between sports-betting and casinos 
for example. Consequently, a whole range of different regulatory models can be found across 
the internal market; public monopolies, exclusive rights granted pursuant to a tendering 
procedure, a limited number of licences or concessions, an unlimited number of licences or 
concessions, and in a few corners, total prohibitions stand. One result of such a preponderance 
of different approaches is that the internal market cannot be described as being a single 
market; there is very little integration between the various national markets and private 
operators are frequently hindered in their exercise of the freedom of establishment and 
moreover the free movement of services. 
 It is not the object of this paper to decry this state of affairs, but rather to explain how 
the principle of transparency has an important role to play through ensuring that some of these 
restrictions which underpin the fragmentation of the market are genuine. As such it will be 
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explained how „regulatory transparency‟ could and should be utilised so to ensure that 
monopoly providers are regulated in a manner which is consistent with the objectives which 
underpin their position in the market and ultimately exclude other operators from gaining 
access thereto.  
 The continued prevalence of monopolies is a reflection of the deference maintained to 
the regulatory preferences of Member States. Nevertheless, this does not mean that such 
monopolies operate outside of the internal market, on some sort of elevated pedestal far 
removed from developments in Union law. Such monopolies only remain in existence to the 
extent that the restrictive measures underpinning them are proportionate to the objectives 
which the overarching regulatory architecture seeks to achieve. Should a monopolist not be 
regulated so as to give effect to these objectives, then to what extent can that particular 
monopoly system be considered as suitable and necessary for attaining the given regulatory 
objectives? Can that very same Member State convincingly seek to rely upon these aims so as 
to keep operators legally established and regulated in other Member States out of their 
market? Given the regulatory opacity in this field it is often difficult to ascertain whether a 
monopolist is in fact being regulated in such a manner, i.e. that the monopoly actually 
conforms with the objectives of the regime giving rise to its existence. If such regulation is 
not „consistent and systematic‟ with the regulatory objectives then arguably the monopoly 
regime is not fit for purpose, and the monopoly cannot be considered to be a proportionate 
means to uphold the given objectives. Thought of this way, Union law keeps the national 
regulator in check, ensuring that the monopolist is regulated in line with national objectives. 
Should the opposite be concluded then the monopoly could be argued as being incompatible 
with Union law. Consequently, either the regulatory regime should be reformed so as to bring 
the monopolist into line with national law or the regulatory regime is amended, perhaps 
admitting one or more cross-border suppliers. 
 This is all rather theoretical however in the face of transparency being absent from the 
regulation of most monopoly providers; it is hard to ascertain with any degree of certainty 
how such providers are actually being regulated. Thus, this article aims to show how 
transparency has a role to play in all gambling markets, not only to ensure non-discriminatory 
market access where licences or concessions are awarded, but to show that the exclusion of 
market access is also in line with Union law. In essence it suggests that it is in the interest of 
Member States which favour monopolies as a means of supplying gambling services that 
regulatory transparency is in their interest. Ultimately such regulators would be enabled to 
show ab initio that regulation of that monopolist is in conformity with Union law. Such an 
 
5 
approach is less farfetched when the decision of the Court in Betfair is taken into account. The 
licence upon which an exclusive rights holder provides gambling services need not be subject 
to the obligation of transparency where a public operator is subject to „direct State 
supervision‟ or where the private operator is subject to „strict control‟.8 This may appear 
contradictory to some parties, but without evidence based reasoning, the debate surround the 
regulation of gambling in the internal market will suffer, as it does in other aspects, such as 
questions relating to addiction.  
 In this respect this discussion can be distinguished from that pertaining to that 
surrounding monopolies and the application of competition law to such entities under former 
Article 106 TFEU. Member States to reserve exclusive rights to themselves of public bodies 
under their control in light of Article 345 TFEU.
9
 Nevertheless the exercise of such exclusive 
rights does not earn an undertaking shelter from the forces of the internal market given the 
application of Article 106(1) TFEU.
10
 It is not the objective of this paper to enter discussion 
on the relevance of this provision to the gambling sector, other than to note that the grant of 
such exclusive rights do not receive exclusive treatment in terms of justification within free 
movement law. Rather, those rights which constitute indistinctly applicable measures can only 
be justified on the basis of mandatory requirements as per Mediawet I.
11
 Therefore, the 
justification of such restrictive measures in terms of restrictions to Article 56 TFEU draw 
upon the case-law which has been developed from Schindler onwards.
12
 Consequently this 
particular avenue is not explored any further given that such justifications will draw upon the 
case-law will be discussed. Significantly however this very fact illustrates how regulatory 
transparency remains important in situations where an exclusive right has been granted to a 
monopolist and national authorities wish to rely upon Article 106(1) TFEU; transparency will 
be required to show that such restrictive measures are in fact justifiable. 
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 This paper will be divided into the following five parts. Part I will provide a brief 
exposé of what is understood for the purposes of this paper by „regulatory transparency‟. Part 
II discusses the regulatory competence which Member States currently enjoy, in terms of how 
the Court has established the margin of discretion enjoyed when regulating gambling and 
limits to the exercise of this discretion. Part III considers the case-law which has developed 
under the obligation of transparency umbrella and how this has migrated to encompass the 
award of licences and concessions in the gambling sector. Part IV considers regulatory 
opacity in gambling regulation and the national level, considering transparency in relation to 
regulatory objectives, the granting of market access and finally obligations, supervision and 
enforcement. 
 
I. Regulatory Transparency 
 
Transparency will be understood from a broad perspective for the purposes of this paper. As 
already indicated the obligation of transparency developed by the Court in relation to the 
award of contracts and public service concessions falling outwith the scope of secondary 
legislation is one incarnation of transparency which is relevant for the regulation of gambling. 
However, the remit of this paper takes it beyond this single conception of transparency so as 
to encompass the entire regulatory process relating to gambling services to ensure the 
accountability of the regulatory system. Failing to do so entails that non-arbitrary standard 
setting or enforcement becomes impossible.
13
 Moreover, requiring regulatory bodies to give 
reasons, to motivate their decisions, constitutes a means by which the persons to “keep an eye 
on the authorities‟ activities and thereby to ensure that a given administrative decision is not 
defective”. 14 Following Jordana and Levi-Faur two of five dimensions fundamental to 
accountability and transparency of regulatory systems thread through this paper, namely; the 
transparency of the rules to be followed and the accountability and transparency of regulating 
actors.
15
 As will become evident regulatory systems differ not only in terms of the 
transparency of rules which suppliers must abide by but also whether the assessment process 
is transparent. Whilst this form of transparency is important, the principal focus of 
                                                 
13
 Jordana, J. & Levi-Faur, D., The Politics of Regulation. Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of 
Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 127. 
14
 Vesterdorf, B., „Transparency – Not Just a Vogue Word‟, 22 Fordham International Law Journal (1998-
1999), 902, at p. 910. 
15
 Ibid., p. 128. The other three dimensions being the accountability and transparency of the decision-making 
process involved in the setting of rules and standards, the accountability and transparency of activities of 
regulated actors and of feedback processes. 
 
7 
accountability in this instance is not whether a particular operator can hold the regulator to 
account but whether regulatory practices are compatible with the requirements of EU law. 
The focus of accountability here reflects compatibility with the free movement provisions 
rather than processes to hold the regulator to account. 
 Yet, what in essence does transparency encapsulate? In response to the stock market 
crash of 1929 Louis Brandeis argued in relation to the lack of disclosure by companies as to 
their financial health that “publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”16 How does this process of 
disinfection occur? By reducing uncertainty through the provision of information for the 
recipient thereof.
17
 Moreover transparency has been described as: 
“… a measure of the degree to which the existence, content, or meaning of a law, 
regulation, action, process, or condition is ascertainable or understandable by a party 
with reason to be interested in that law, regulation, action, process, or condition.”18 
As already hinted at by reference to licensing procedures transparency involves far more than 
merely enlightening the public as to the content of legislation but encompasses regulatory 
processes, such as the award of licences and concessions for gambling services. Not only does 
this facilitate holding the activities of regulatory authorities to account, in this instance in 
terms of their compatibility or otherwise with the requirements of European gambling related 
case-law, but it allows those authorities to signal to those who, outside of regulatory authority 
and in possession of less information than that authority, may otherwise view governmental 
action with “little more credence than the bids of a poker player might be viewed”.19 
Therefore transparency helps diminish public fears and thus reduce distrust between a 
government and the public.  
 There is no reason to limit the effects of such signalling to the national arena, given 
that in the international context transparency has been identified as a means to “induce 
Members to behave in a WTO-consistent manner” given that their legislation can be better 
                                                 
16
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monitored by other Members.
20
 This can also be expected to extend to “cover discrimination 
stemming from discretionary or arbitrary decisions made by regulatory authorities” such as 
regarding licence award procedures in the transnational setting of the internal market.
21
 Thus 
signalling can be expected to reduce distrust by the regulatory peers of a gambling regulator, 
as well as undertakings established in other jurisdictions with an interest in entering a 
regulated market. 
 Information disclosure plays a role in reducing the likelihood of arbitrary decision 
making on the part of regulatory authorities. Without suggesting that regulators engage in 
corrupt practices observations made by Weil indicate how disclosure laws can counter corrupt 
practices do not lack relevance in the current context. Such laws seek to redress information 
asymmetry which “arises when potential users have inadequate information concerning the 
practices of those parties which have been delegated political or organizational authority.”22 
Given that gambling regulators, particularly when regulatory powers are vested within 
ministries which may have a direct interest in revenues generated by gambling operators 
within their Member State, greater disclosure of information, and thus transparency 
surrounding regulatory practice, will improve the perception of the state in terms of truly 
upholding public policy objectives rather than protecting its own vested interests. Thus 
transparency, even where corruption does not prevail is a means to build trust in vertical 
relationships between regulatory institutions and individuals.
23
 Trust can also play an 
important role in horizontal relationships; those between regulatory authorities as suggested 
by Advocate General Mengozzi in his Opinions in Carmen Media and Markus Stoß and as 
will be subsequently shown for horizontal regulatory cooperation to be viable information 




 Certain uses to which transparency is put go beyond the scope of this paper, and these   
uses concern the use of transparency by consumers as a tool to reach policy goals and 
instances where transparency dilutes informational asymmetries to enable greater 
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participation of civil society. Firstly, transparency is used by regulators to encourage change 
in a particular field through requiring that suppliers disclose information relating to the goods 
or services. Through such disclosure governments seek to attain certain public policy goals, 
relying on the responses of users of goods or services and their behaviour in light of the 
disclosed information to create incentives for suppliers to change their behaviour.
25
 Given the 
focus of this article on regulatory transparency the role that the provision of information by 
suppliers of gambling services to (potential) consumers will receive no attention.
26
   
Secondly relating to civil society transparency can be considered to go beyond merely 
informing consumers as to what decisions have been taken to understanding transparency as a 
two way street whereby public service providers respond to their users.
27
 Whilst some 
providers of gambling services within the EU are publically owned, whether they can be 
considered as providing a public service is a moot point, and one which remains open for 
discussion in another forum. 
 
II. National Regulatory Competence 
 
Gambling related case-law emanating from Luxembourg has staunchly defended the right of 
national authorities to regulate national markets in light of national concerns and policy 
preferences with relatively minimal regard required for regulatory regimes prevailing in other 
Member States. Given the lack of any applicable harmonisation in secondary legislation at the 
Union level this is hardly a novel stance, but rather it is the degree to which Member States 
need not pay attention to the regulatory activities of their neighbours which possibly irks 
those interests seeking to rely on the free movement of services and the freedom of 
establishment. Whilst Member States are “free to set the objectives of their policy on betting 
and gaming and, where appropriate, to define the level of protection sought”28 “in accordance 
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with [their] own scale of values”29 it is the relatively light touch of the Court in its application 
of the proportionality principle which by and large has done little to reign in the exercise of 
margin of discretion. Doukas and Anderson have noted how the Court has only been willing 
to declare as incompatible “manifestly discriminatory or disproportionate national 
measures”,30 and whilst the Court did strike down the regulatory systems at the heart of the 
provision of sports-betting in Germany and casinos in Austria,
31
 on many occasions its 
gambling specific case-law has played into the hands of the obfuscation provided by the often 
found veil of regulatory opacity. In reviewing the gambling related case-law which has arisen 
to date attention will firstly be directed towards those decisions which established and defined 
the margin of discretion before turning to those decisions concerned with how that discretion 
has been exercised. These latter cases will illustrate the need for regulatory transparency. 
 
IIa. Establishing the Margin of Discretion 
The first case which pitted national gambling legislation against the freedom to provide 
services was that of Schindler in which tickets for a German lottery were posted to residents 
of the United Kingdom at time when large-scale lottery gambling was prohibited within the 
latter jurisdiction. The two Schindler brothers who mailed the tickets sought to establish that 
the prohibition in question was incompatible with the free movement of services. The High 
Court felt it necessary to inquire whether social policy reasons and the prevention of fraud 
constituted legitimate public policy and public morality considerations so as to justify 
restrictions.
32
 Four grounds were enumerated by the Court of Justice which provided national 
authorities “a sufficient degree of latitude” to determine national gambling policy. Three of 
the four grounds could form the basis of a objective justification to restrict indistinctly 
applicable measures restricting the freedom to supply services, these being; firstly the moral, 
religious and cultural aspects of gambling; secondly, the high risk of crime and fraud and 
thirdly that gambling constitutes an incitement to spend which can entail damaging 
consequences for individuals and society. The fourth ground being that gambling generated 
revenues make significant contributions to the financing of benevolent or public interest 
activities, or at least that was the case of lotteries as discussed in Schindler. This degree of 
latitude was thus based upon what was deemed necessary to protect players, including 
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Loaded”, 27 Yearbook of European Law (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2008), 237 et seq, at p. 253.  
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32
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specific social and cultural features of the Member State so as to maintain order in society. As 
such, it permits national authorities the discretion to determine the design of the operation of 
gambling services and were necessary the eventual restriction of any such services.
33
 
 Next in line is the Court‟s decision in Läärä which in essence entails that the 
proportionality of a restrictive measure is tested only in relation to the regulatory regime in 
question.
34
  Not only may Member States opt for different objectives and standards, but also 
for different systems of protection. Differences in the systems embodied by national 
regulation, i.e. monopoly versus licensing, “cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and 
the proportionality of, the provisions enacted”.35 This was strengthened in the far more recent 
decision from September 2010 in Markus Stoß where the Court noted that in the application 
of the proportionality principle that “it is in particular not necessary, … that a restrictive 
measure decreed by the authorities of one Member State should correspond to a view shared 
by all the Member States concerning the means of protecting the legitimate interest at 
issue”.36 National regulatory autonomy, and thus the margin of discretion, is secured to a 
degree; an operator excluded from one domestic market which relies upon a monopolist to 
provide sports-betting services for example cannot rely upon the fact that in another Member 
State the same sector is supplied by an unlimited number of licence-holders. The application 
of the proportionality test in Läärä has been described as „soft‟,37 and the approach of the 
Court in terms of national regulatory discretion was repeated in the subsequent case of 
Zenatti.
38
 However, the Court in Zenatti noted that national legislation must be “genuinely 
directed to realising the objectives which are capable of justifying it”; in this case the 
restriction of sports-betting to limit the harmful effects of this activity.
39
 Consequently there 
needs to be a real connection between public interest grounds advanced by a Member State 
and the legislation relied upon, “formal justification on the grounds of public interest is no 
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38
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39
 Zenatti, paras. 37-8. 
 
12 
longer sufficient.”40 Subsequently Anomar witnessed the reaffirmation of the Member States‟ 
ability “in the context of the power of assessment” to determine the objectives of their 
regulatory regime, the means which they consider the most suited to achieving such 
objectives and to “establish rules for the operation and playing of games, which may be more 
or less strict”.41  
 However, Gambelli took the Member States to task with a more questioning approach 
in the line of that to which Zenatti bore witness. Whilst this did not diminish the national 
margin of competence to determine the objectives and standards of the national regulatory 
regime it nevertheless impacts the execution of it. As such it marks the beginning of the 
Court‟s work in establishing parameters as to how Member States can exercise their margin of 
discretion, which is further developed in its post-Liga Portuguesa decisions. The innovative 
element of Gambelli being the introduction of a “hypocrisy test”42 to ensure that objectives 
which the Member State seeks to rely upon to exclude operators from other Member States 
from entering the domestic market are actually employed vis-à-vis national providers. 
Factually, the situation giving rise to the preliminary reference reflected that of arising in 
Zenatti, however the referring court expressed concerns about whether the Italian state was 
practicing what it preached; were the objectives which were being relied upon to prevent 
operators based elsewhere from effectively relying upon the freedom to provide services 
embodied in Article 56 TFEU actually being applied against operators licensed within the 
Italian regime? The national court was concerned by “the considerable expansion of betting 
and gaming which the Italian State [was] pursuing at national level for the purpose of 
collecting taxation revenues”.43 Such a factual account clearly contrasted with the requirement 
for a genuine diminution of gambling opportunities as derived from the Court in Zenatti.
44
 
Whilst preserving the existence of a sufficient margin of discretion to enable national 
authorities to determine what consumer protection and the preservation of public order require 
in light of moral, religious, and cultural factors as well as the harmful consequences of 
gambling,
45
 the Court proceeded to tighten the noose around those authorities in terms of the 
                                                 
40
 Hoekx, N., „Placanica: Combating Criminality vs. Reducing Gambling Opportunities As Grounds for 
Justification in the ECJ‟s Jurisprudence‟, in Spapens T., Littler, A. & Fijnaut, C. Crime, Addiction and the 
Regulation of Gambling (Leiden; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), p. 73. 
41
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42
 De Koning, M. and van der Beek, J.C.M., „De Goksaga wederom vervolgd: De Lotto/Ladbrokes‟, Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2005, no. 7/8, p. 185.  
43
 Gambelli, para. 22.  
44
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45
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execution of those requirements. Restrictions, justified by imperative requirements, with the 
aim of consumer protection and the prevention of fraud and incitement to squander of 
gambling must be suitable for achieving such objectives “inasmuch as they must serve to limit 
betting activities in a consistent and systematic manner”.46 Therefore should a Member State 
incite and encourage participation in a particular form of gambling then the authorities of that 
State foreclose themselves from invoking public order concerns relating to the need to 
“reduce opportunities for betting” to justify restrictive measures.47 As will become apparent in 
the subsequent narrative whilst the objectives of gambling regulation may be apparent the 
lack of regulatory transparency entails that it is frequently difficult to establish whether 
national authorities are indeed regulating national providers in a manner which is consistent 
and systematic with the objectives relied upon to exclude the cross-border movement of 
gambling services and service suppliers.  
 A preliminary reference giving rise to the Placanica decision marked the final 
instalment of the Italian sports-betting trilogy which marks a further small step in the 
demarcation of boundaries to the execution of the national margin of discretion. In contrast to 
the previous cases the Court split the objectives at hand, notably distinguishing between the 
objectives of reducing gambling opportunities and combating criminality.
48
 It the second 
which deserves our attention, whereby the Court expounded on the notion that it may be 
desirable to expand a gambling sector in a controlled manner so as to draw players away from 
clandestine suppliers. Seemingly this may be achieved through providing authorised operators 
the opportunity to provide a reliable “but at the same time attractive, alternative to a 
prohibited activity”. Consequently authorised operators can offer an extensive range of 
games, advertise on a certain scale, and use new distribution techniques.
49
 Not only is it rather 
unfortunate that the parameters of such activities are rather vague it is all the more regrettable 
from a regulatory transparency perspective that the Court did not offer any hint of guidance as 
to what level of clandestine activity would be required to trigger such a controlled expansion. 
Without the ex ante establishment of objective criteria for determining the point at which the 
size of the illegal gambling market within a Member State is sufficiently large so as to justify 
the expansion of gambling by authorised providers there is a danger that national authorities 
will over state the need for such expansion. Assuming that there is at least one authorised 
provider for the form of illegal gambling in question, is there a threshold at below which a 
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Member State can no longer rely upon the existence of illegal gambling to justify the 
expansion of the legal sector?
50
 If there are just two illegal operators can a state monopolist 
legitimately expand its offer, without enforcement measures being taken against the said 
illegal operators? Furthermore, without a duty on national authorities to disclose the size of 
the illegal market and the evidence upon which they base their calculations, any expansion of 
the market given the lack of transparency as to the State‟s perception of the illegal market will 
be open to suspicion.
51
 However, the lack of an evidence based approach should not come as 
a surprise to those familiar with the Court‟s case-law, it has also been noted there has been no 
call from the ECJ as to the need for evidence in terms of the potential health risks posed by 
gambling.
52
 This is somewhat regrettable given the earlier signal of the Court in the Lindman 
case where the Court referred to the lack of evidence in the case file establishing a causal 
relationship between the risks that the Finnish government in the case was concerned about 
arising from the participation of Finns in lotteries organised in other Member States.
53
 
Intriguingly however, the Court did have an opportunity in Placanica to refer to the value of 
evidence in the context of combating crime given that in its observations in this case the 
Italian Government had “referred to a number of factual elements, including, notably, an 
investigation into the betting and gaming sector carried out by the Sixth Permanent 
Committee (Finance and the Treasury) of the Italian Senate.”54 
 The next case of Liga Portuguesa focuses upon the ability of national authorities not 
to heed what fellow regulators in other Member States are doing. Liga Portuguesa is the first 
case to arise which did not draw upon any possible exercise of the freedom of establishment, 
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with the operator in question seeking to provide its services solely via the internet, without 
any recourse to agents or subsidiaries located within the Member State where the service was 
being received. Bwin, the private operator in question, supplied a range of gambling services 
to residents of Portugal on the basis of a licence issued by Gibraltar which conflicted with the 
monopoly enjoyed by Santa Casa for the provision of lotteries, lotto games and sports betting 
services. Bwin was subsequently fined for providing such services in contravention of Santa 
Casa‟s monopoly and during the course of an action for annulment of this decision, a 
preliminary questioned was referred to Luxembourg. Seemingly the Portuguese model was 
centred on the objective of combating crime and fraud, “specifically the protection of 
consumers of games of chance against fraud on the part of the operators”.55 Portugal had 
argued that the monopoly model was necessary because authorities of Member States lack the 
means of control over operators which are established in other Member States yet providing 
their gambling services via the internet as they have over operators established within their 
own territory. According to the Court the Portuguese authorities were entitled to pay no 
regard to the fact that Bwin was subject to statutory conditions and controls by the competent 
authorities of another State due to the Court‟s view that authorities in the operator‟s Member 
State of establishment are unable to assess “the professional qualities and integrity of 
operators”.56  In essence Portugal was thus entitled to conclude that regulation by other 
Member States failed to provide sufficient assurance that Portuguese residents were protected 
against the risks of crime and fraud in cross-border situations. 
 Whilst this is not the forum to consider how the Court subtly altered the question 
asked by the Portuguese court nor how the application of mutual recognition has no role to 
play in instances where monopoly regimes are otherwise deemed suitable and necessary 
means to achieve regulatory ends, it sets a precedent within which national authorities need 
not heed what is being done elsewhere. This is in contrast to the hint towards mutual 
recognition in Gambelli in relation to the imposition of criminal penalties on the data 
transmission centres which acted as intermediaries for the United Kingdom based 
bookmakers. Guidance to the national court was given to the effect that it would have to 
consider whether such penalties went beyond what was necessary to combat fraud “especially 
where the supplier of the services is subject in his Member State of establishment to a 
regulating entailing controls and penalties.”57 Equally the blanket exclusion of companies 
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quoted on the regulated markets of other Member States from the licence procedure “may be 
considered to be a measure which goes beyond what is necessary to check fraud” given that 
other means existed to check the probity of such potential suppliers rather than solely listing 
on the Italian stock exchange. This became clearer in Placanica where such exclusion was 
held to go beyond what was considered necessary to uphold the objective in question.
58
 It can 
be readily appreciated that for conditional recognition of regulatory equivalence to work 
Member States would have to regulate in a transparent manner and ensure that information is 




IIb. Exercising the Margin of Discretion 
Subsequent case-law, in this section, will concentrate upon the operationalization of the 
consistency and systematic requirement from which the need for regulatory transparency 
emerges and becomes more transparent. In this regard the Ladbrokes decision will be 
discussed.  The Court‟s embrace of the obligation of transparency in its gambling case-law, 
the relevant cases shall be discussed following the overview of the growth of the obligation of 
transparency more generally in the following section entitled „Obligation of Transparency‟.
 Returning to the concept of consistent and systematic, as it refers to the execution of 
regulatory policies which seek to reduce opportunities for gambling, the decision of the Court 
in Ladbrokes provides a useful illustration of how greater information in the regulation of 
gambling is necessary. Whilst the subtle call in Lindman for evidence has never been at the 
forefront the Court‟s decisions, the need for evidence has crept into the language of the Court 
with a dual dimension. In Markus Stoß the Court noted how a Member State could not be 
prevented from relying upon a restrictive measure which serves to attain a justifiable objective 
to the freedom to provide services “solely on the ground that that Member State is not able to 
produce studies service as a basis for the adoption of the legislation at issue”. 60 This would 
seem to suggest that national authorities are not under an EU obligation to provide 
information at the point at which they introduce restrictive measures. However Ladbrokes 
shows that for as long as national courts are called upon to review the compatibility of the 
execution of national policies with underpinning regulatory objectives, regulatory 
transparency should not be dismissed as an inconvenient irrelevance by those benefiting from 
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the current opaque regulatory approach.        
 The judgment in Ladbrokes arose following a preliminary question referred by the 
Hoge Raad during a protected legal battle between the incumbent monopolist for the 
provision of sports-betting services in the Netherlands and Ladbrokes. Ladbrokes was 
established in the United Kingdom and regulated pursuant to the regulatory regime which 
preceded that introduced by the Gambling Act 2005. Under domestic legislation the 
incumbent held the singe licence available for the provision of such services and it had 
attained an injunction against Ladbrokes ordering that the provision of sports-betting services 
to residents of the Netherlands. Advice was sought to ascertain the compatibility of the Dutch 
regime, particularly given the dual objectives; the protection of consumers from addiction to 
gambling services and the prevention of fraud. Recalling firstly Gambelli restrictions limiting 
betting opportunities must do so in a consistent and systematic manner, whilst Placanica 
paved the way for authorities to engage in an expansionist policy in order to combat crime by 
channelling demand into legal avenues. Considered together the case-law appears in danger of 
self-contradiction, yet the judgement allows the Court to provide further guidance as to the 
nature of consistent and systematic restrictions. In so doing it calls upon the national court to 
assess evidence, which may not otherwise be in the public domain.  
 Responding to concerns that the expansionist policy may excessively incite and 
encourage participation guidance is given as to what the national court should consider so as 
to review whether expansion of supply is proportionate with the regulatory objectives. Firstly 
the national court must consider whether “unlawful gaming activities constitute a problem in 
the Netherlands” and whether the “expansion of authorised and regulated activities would be 
liable to solve the problem”.61 Secondly, to justify an expansion of lawful gambling in the 
face of the objective of preventing excessive gambling, such an expansion can only be lawful 
if the “scale of unlawful activity is significant” and the measures adopted channel demand 
into lawful avenues.
62
 The Court then notes that evidence presented by the incumbent that 
demand for gambling “particularly at the clandestine level” exists must be taken into 
consideration.
63
 Two initial responses can thus be made; the Court places the national court in 
the position of the regulator. The national court must determine whether there is a problem 
and moreover whether this is „significant‟. Furthermore it must assess whether substitution 
through an expansion of the legal supply would counter this. Secondly the national court is to 
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take evidence into consideration as to the scale of the alleged problem. Via the decision of the 
national court it will be interesting to see whether such evidentiary requirements can be met 
on the basis of information which is in the public domain, or will the national court have to 
pierce the veil of regulatory opacity to obtain this information? In this regard information 
upon which the regulatory authorities should be basing their decisions on will come to light.
 In actual fact the Court refers to some evidence which it considers “may establish an 
intention on the part of the national authorities to narrowly circumscribe the expansion of 
games of chance”.64 Of greater significance it then states that the national court must decide 
whether “the expansion of games of chance is being supervised effectively by the Netherlands 
authorities” in such as manner to reconcile the expansionist policy with that of protecting 
consumers against the dangers of gambling.
65
 Here the Court is pointing towards the need for 
the actions of gambling regulatory authorities to be reviewed, which gains considerable 
currency Betfair. Where regulatory opacity prevails regulators would thus have a choice it 
seems; regulate in a transparent manner so as to minimise the risk of such discourse occurring 
before courts or to have their hands forced and for information to be disclosed in legal 
proceedings. As this review shows, whilst Member States may be able to arrange their deck of 
cards as they see fit, this does not entail that EU law does not have an interest in what happens 
„behind the scenes‟ and therefore regulatory competence needs to be accompanied by 
regulatory transparency. It is time for national poker faces to be removed. 
 
III. Obligation of Transparency 
 
The duty or obligation of transparency has evolved through the extension of transparency 
beyond secondary legislation concerning public procurement. Whilst it is not the purview of 
this contribution to assess whether this is desirable in terms of public procurement law, nor 
discuss every twist in the development of the case-law, the significance of this development 
for the gambling sector cannot be ignored and neither shall its main contours. Nevertheless a 
brief review of this field will be provided to enable an appreciation of the application of 
transparency in an integral part of the Court‟s approach to the granting of authorisation for the 
provision of gambling services.  
 Since the 1970s secondary legislation has regulated public authorities in their 
procurement of works, goods and services with current legislation taking the form of two 
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consolidating directives; one of a general nature applicable to public works, public supply 
contracts and public services contracts with the second applicable to specific sectors.
66
 The 
Court considers that secondary legislation eliminates barriers to the free movement of services 
and to protect the interests of operators wishing to provide goods and services to public 
authorities in Member States other than the one in which they are established.
67
 Indeed Recital 
2 of Directive 2004/18/EC maintains this approach, nothing the need to respect the principles 
found within the Treaty and free movement principles, including “the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of transparency.” For contracts of a sufficiently high value 
detailed procedures abound, with the objective of ensuring that procurement at the Union 
level is open to competition. However, commentators in this field note how the Court has 
adopted a rule of reason through which established principles of Union law have been 
authenticated in their application to this field.
68
 Such reasoning clearly resonates with the 
approach the Court has taken in the most recent cases concerning the award of licences, which 
belong to a wider class of arrangements which fall beyond the scope of secondary legislation. 
The case-law of the Court not only encompasses contracts but also „service concessions‟ 
where consideration for the performance of the service is formed by the right to exploit the 
service rather than the operator receiving solely remuneration from the contracting authority. 
As noted in Parking Brixen such constructions are those where “the provider takes the risk of 
operating the services in question…”.69 Spill-over of the principles embodied by secondary 
legislation to concessions outside of their scope first arose in Telaustria where the Court 
nevertheless held that the contracting entities in question were “bound to comply with the 
fundamental rules of the Treaty, in general and the principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, in particular”.70 Even in the absence of any applicable directives the 
contracting authority is duty bound to ensure that there is a “degree of advertising sufficient to 
enable the services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement 
procedures to be reviewed”.71 Failure to hold a competition for the award of a services 
                                                 
66
 Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, [2004] OJ L134/114 and Directive 2004/17 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, [2004] OJ L134/1 
respectively.  
67
 Case C-360/96, Gemeente Arnhem and Gemeente Rheden v. BFI Holding BV, [1998] ECR I-6821, para. 41. 
68
 Bovis, C.H., „Developing Public Procurement Regulation: Jurisprudence and its Influence on Law Making‟, 
Common Market Law Review, 43 (2006), 461-495, p. 461. 
69
 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen und Stadtwerke Brixen AG, [2005] ECR I-8585, 
para. 40. 
70
 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG, [2000] ECR I-
10745, para. 60. 
71
 Telaustria, para. 62. 
 
20 
concession thus not only breaches Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, but also the principles of equal 
treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.
72
 Consequently contracting authorities under 
the obligation of transparency are bound to open up an award procedure so that undertakings 
established within the internal market can bid for the concession in question should they be 
interested in doing so.
73
 Only where there is an insufficient connection with the functioning of 
the internal market given “special circumstances” such as the “very modest financial interest 
at stake” so as to entail that the contract would not be of any interest to  undertakings in other 
Member States may an authority not follow up on its obligation of transparency.
74
 
 Whilst Gambelli and Placanica hinted at the application of procurement legislation for 
gambling related licences, it took an infringement procedure of the European Commission to 
clarify the Court‟s position on this matter, in Commission v. Italy.75 Arising from the same 
legal quagmire as these two preliminary references the Commission‟s procedure challenged 
Italy‟s failure to invite any bids for the renewal of 329 licences for horse-race betting 
operations. Relying upon the classification of these licences as public services concessions as 
found in Placanica the Court referred to the obligation of transparency as a means to ensure 
that the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality are 
complied with.
76
 Through failing to invite bids for the grant of these 329 licences the Italian 
authorities breached Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and in particular, the general principle of 
transparency and the obligation to ensure a sufficient degree of advertising through 




 Unfortunately there is little discussion upon the appropriateness of treating licences for 
betting services as public service concessions, given that in this decision the Court refers to 
the absence of any attempt by the Italian authorities to refute the classification of these 
licences as concessions and moves swiftly onwards.
78
 Placanica itself reveals that Italy had 
unlawfully excluded operators established in other Member States from the tender procedure 
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for the award of licences, although at no point was this explicitly discussed in terms of public 
service concessions as such.
79
 Brown notes that the extension of fundamental elements of the 
procurement rules to arrangements which are “even f further removed from the 
straightforward contracts for pecuniary interest that were originally targeted by the 
Procurement Directives themselves”.80 Nevertheless the Court clearly brings licences for the 
provision of gambling services into the fold of the Telaustria line of reasoning. Boundaries 
have been placed around the obligation of transparency following Telaustria, and as such the 
obligation will not apply to situations where a licence is awarded in-house.
81
 Such 
circumstances arise where a contracting authority must not be excluded from being able to 
exercise control over the concession holder in a manner “similar to that which it exercises 
over its own departments”.82  
 Following Betfair the Court is likely to be called to explore the application of these 
boundaries in relation to the award of gambling concessions, licences and other forms of 
market access given the nature of its decision in this case in which the application of this case-
law has taken an interesting and possibly awkward turn. Ultimately the fly in the ointment 
will derive from questions of definition, concerning whether the requisite conditions have 
been met to avoid a competitive tendering procedure for the award of an exclusive licence. 
Purely from a transparency point of view however this somewhat paradoxical decision could 
act as a catalyst for enhanced regulatory transparency in the sector. Betfair concerns the 
exclusion of the United Kingdom based operator from the Dutch sports-betting and horserace 
betting markets and the refusal of the competent Dutch authorities to provide it with 
authorisation to enter the domestic market.
83
 Following the refusal of its request for a licence 
for each of these two market sectors, Betfair was prohibited from providing its services to 
residents of the Netherlands. Subsequently the licences held by the incumbents were renewed 
and Betfair challenged this, alleging that under the case of Commission v. Italy the 
Netherlands had failed to respect the principle of transparency. In this decision the Court 
extended the approach taken in relation to service concession contracts as discussed above to 
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the single licences at stake in the two respective and legally distinct gambling sectors. Article 
56 TFEU applies in the same manner in terms of the principles of equal treatment and the 
obligation of transparency to „administrative licences‟ such as those in question as it does to 
concessions. Moreover the Court held that “the obligation of transparency appears to be a 
mandatory prior condition of the right of a Member State to award to an operator the 
exclusive right to carry on an economic activity, irrespective of the method of selecting that 
operator”.84 Here the Court took a functional approach, noting that effects of such licences 
“on undertakings established in other Member States and potentially interested in that activity 
are the same as those of a service concession agreement”.85 The Court then proceeded to note 
how the award of such licences must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria 
known in advance, so as to prevent the arbitrary exercise of discretion on the part of the 
awarding authority.
86
 Consequently the need for a „sufficient degree of advertising‟ extends to 
this administrative form of licensing,
87
 and therefore according to the Court in Carmen Media 
the pursuance of legitimate objectives “cannot render legitimate discretionary conduct on the 
part of the national authorities which is liable to negate the effectiveness of provisions of EU 
law”.88 The Betfair approach thus far was emboldened by the response of the Court the award 
of concessions for the operation of casinos in Austria, a process which wholly negated the 
obligation of transparency.
89
 The Court considered that the obligation of transparency to be a 
pre-condition which Member States must satisfy so as to be able to award licences, once again 
on an effects based approach considering the impact on undertakings established in other 
Member States which could be potential bidders. A total absence of transparency can be 
nothing other than an infringement of the Articles 49 and 56 TFEU.
90
 
 Considering the regulatory opacity in many Member States at the award of an 
exclusive right, this aspect of transparency marks a huge step forward in terms of gambling 
regulation. As such it has the potential to make significant inroads into ensuring that Member 
States respect the freedom to provide services in the execution of their policy and regulatory 
preferences determined at the national level. Such potential is all the more increased given 
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that the same concerns arise, and the obligation of transparency equally arises, when a licence 
is being renewed as opposed to awarded for the first time.
91
 
 Thus far the narrative reads strongly in favour of those seeking a strong reliance on 
free movement principles in the face of the denial of unconditional recognition; where 
licences are in place operators established within the internal market should have equal access 
to and equal treatment within the licensing procedure. Hopes of such a utopia for private 
operators is dashed however by the Court‟s response to claims by the Dutch government that 
the system of exclusive licences embodied in national legislation constitutes appropriate and 
proportionate restrictions of free movement. The Court proceeds to note that the obligation of 
transparency need not apply to the award or renewal of a single licence if that licence is 
awarded to “a public operator whose management is subject to direct State supervision or a 
private operator whose activities are subject to strict control by the public authorities”.92 
 It can readily be anticipated that discourse will arise as to what constitutes „direct State 
supervision‟ and „strict control by the public authorities‟, and probably the Court has done 
itself no favours if it wishes to reduce the tirade of gambling related preliminary references. 
Indeed, will this reference to public operators tally with the notion of in-house contracting as 
developed in public procurement legislation?
93
 National courts will become the battlefields in 
the defining these concepts. Whilst the margin of discretion which Member States enjoy has 
not been diminished, their regulatory track record will now be viewed against the light of day. 
Paradoxically, through providing a safe haven for Member States to avoid the duty of 
transparency those very authorities will have to regulate in a transparent manner to prove that 
the duty does not apply to them.       
 Lacking any real degree of regulatory transparency many challengers to claims that an 
avoidance of the obligation of transparency is justifiable will find themselves against a veil of 
regulatory opacity which will be described further below. To ensure that Member States 
cannot hide behind the language of the Court‟s case-law, and thus to uphold the effective and 
full application of the free movement principles, the need for regulatory transparency has 
never been more apparent. 
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IV. Regulatory Opacity and Gambling Regulation 
 
Various approaches to regulating gambling are found throughout the Member States, no only 
in terms of objectives and standards, but also in relation to the regulatory machinery which is 
employed and the subsequent degree of transparency which prevails. Although it is beyond 
the scope and capacity of this section to detail the institutional mechanisms applicable to all 
forms of gambling across the twenty-seven Member States it is nonetheless important to 
appreciate the nature of the regulatory opacity which often prevails. Regulatory opacity as 
such is not unique to gambling services, but a feature of services regulation in general given 
regulatory intensity and complexity, combined with the lack of transparency which 
characterises the regulation of many service sectors.
94
  
 Four elements of regulatory transparency will form the backbone of this brief 
overview. Firstly, what are the regulatory objectives which apply to the sector and thus 
possibly will form the basis of objective justifications to justify restrictive measures? 
Secondly, who acts as gatekeeper to the market and how is market access provided? Thirdly, 
once access has been provided to an operator, what are the obligations which licence holders 
must uphold and how is compliance assessed? This is closely related to the fourth point 
concerning supervision and enforcement mechanisms which are used in relation to such 
suppliers. The third and fourth points will be considered together. Through this division it is 
hoped that the lack of transparency which can prevail will become more evident. 
 
IVa. Regulatory Objectives  
Given that the restriction of gambling services must be consistent and systematic with the 
objectives of the given regulatory regime the need for such objectives to be known is 
indisputable. Whilst it is unthinkable that gambling legislation would be enacted without any 
indication as to the objectives sought, Member States differ in terms of the degree of detail 
and whether objectives vary as between sectors. Broad objectives encompassing the entire 
national market will permit regulatory authorities greater discretion within their regulatory 
activities, and in the absence of a statement of regulatory intent and regulatory transparency, 
such discretion could easily slide towards arbitrariness.  
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 Turning to the United Kingdom the Gambling Act 2005 provides three over-arching 
objectives which run through the entirety of the regulatory regime.
95
 These so-called licensing 
objectives are frequently referred to throughout regulatory materials and the work of the 
relevant national authority, the Gambling Commission. To all who have a cursory interest in 
the regulation of commercial gambling in the United Kingdom it is thus readily apparent that 
these objectives are: 
 “(a) preventing ambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated 
 with crime or being used to support crime, 
 (b) ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way, and  
 (c) protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited 
 by gambling.”96 
Whilst such objectives may appear broad in nature they are mitigated in part by the mandate 
of the Gambling Commission which is to “permit gambling, in so far as [it] thinks it 
reasonably consistent with pursuit of the licensing objectives”.97 Again broad in nature, the 
conclusion of the combination of „in so far as‟ with the licensing objectives is to be found 
within the licence conditions and codes of practice which are attached to the operating 
licences which suppliers of gambling services must obtain. A wide multitude of operating 
licences is available, and these include for example a “casino operating licence”, a “general 
betting operating licence” and “remote gambling licence”.98 All operators must adhere to the 
generally applicable Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice in addition to that applicable 
to the specific category of operating licence, such as the Conditions and Codes of Practice 
applicable to Non-remote Casino Licences.
99
 These conditions will be returned to in 
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„Obligations, Supervision and Enforcement‟ as examples of providing guidance to operators 
as to what is expected of them, and thus in turn, the requirements against which they will be 
assessed in their compliance with the regulatory requirements and ultimately the regulatory 
objectives. 
 In contrast the specific enunciation of regulatory objectives given in primary domestic 
legislation in the United Kingdom, the principal piece of law in the Netherlands is somewhat 
hazy in comparison. Within the „general conditions‟ of the Wet op de Kansspelen of 1964 
(hereinafter WoK) no general objectives are given. Reports from the Minister of Justice to the 
Tweede Kamer, the lower chamber of parliament, have shown the objectives to be: 
 “the regulation and control of gambling, with particular attention for combating 
 gambling addiction, the protection of the consumer and combating illegality and 
 criminality.”100 
Additionally, the decisions of the Court in Betfair and Ladbrokes reflect the lack of specific 
regulatory objectives. Whilst under the heading „national legal context‟ of the Court‟s report it 
is clear that the supply of gambling is based on exclusive licences for the sectors concerned, 
and that certain conditions are attached to these licences. However no reference is made to 
regulatory objectives which are subsequently found in the decision of the Court due to an 
absence of a provision explicitly setting out such objectives. In Ladbrokes the Court states 
that “the wording of the first question put by the referring court shows that the objectives of 
the WoK are clearly identified by that court, namely protection of consumers by the curbing 
of addiction to games of chance and the prevention of fraud”.101 Indeed, the question notes 
that the restrictive gambling policy “in fact contributes to the achievement of objectives…. 
namely the curbing of gambling addiction and the prevention of fraud.”102 Similarly the 




 Reference to the decision of the Hoge Raad, when it decided to refer the preliminary 
question to Luxembourg in Ladbrokes, reveals that in finding the objectives of the WoK are 
not explicitly expressed in the legislation itself. Whilst finding the licensing requirement 
embodied in Article 1a suitable for upholding such objectives, the Court does not point to any 
single provision regarding the objectives of the regime. Rather, it describes aspects of the Act 
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in a general nature and refers to parliamentary proceedings, such as that referred to above.
104
  
 Interestingly, the European Commission in its infringement procedure against the 
Netherlands regarding restrictions to the freedom to provide services in the sports-betting 
sector, listed the generation of revenue for the general good as one of the objectives of the 
Dutch regulatory regime.
105
 Of course, such a justification cannot support a restrictive 
measure, but this reading by the Commission is not wholly unfounded. In vesting in the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister for Welfare, Public Health and Culture the right to grant 
an exclusive licence the WoK states that such sports related prize competitions are to be 
organised in the “interests of bodies operating for public benefit, particularly in the area of 
sport and physical education, culture, social welfare and public health.”106 The Commission‟s 
claim was rejected by the Dutch government, which considers that the generation of revenue 
is merely a side-effect of the provision of gambling services.
107
 Whilst the Dutch legislation is 
not unique in referring to the generation of revenue as an objective, it does not offer any 
explicit parameters to this objective vis-à-vis others contained within the legislation.
108
 This 
contrasts with the regulation of the National Lottery in the United Kingdom.
109
 
 To be clear, this is not a criticism of the objectives, but rather the lack of overt 
transparency surrounding their definition and the relationship between different objectives 
where multiple objectives are given. Arguably if the regulatory objectives were truly 
transparent it would not be required for a court decision to make them apparent. Indeed, 
substantive provisions allow conclusions to be drawn as to what the Dutch legislation seeks to 
achieve. Yet this is not the same as an explicit statement of objectives which govern the 
regulatory regime.    
 Lacking any overall objectives in such primary legislation permits changes to be made 
without recourse to the legislative process. Originally casinos were introduced to improve the 
attractiveness of the Netherlands to tourists whereas currently the casino monopolist is seen as 
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an instrument to channel demand for casino gambling into a legal controlled environment.
110
 
Equally De Lotto was originally introduced to capture revenues lost to lotto games organised 
in Germany and to aid De Lotto‟s viability given that in 1971 when lotto was introduced De 
Lotto was authorised to offer only sports-betting services. To what extent do these purposes 
fit with the objectives which are currently used to define the purpose of the WoK? The 
legislation may be ripe for reform,
111
 and whilst this paper is not the appropriate forum to 
tackle this issue, the very fact that such objectives are absent from the primary piece of Dutch 
gambling legislation only serves to show the need for transparency in this sector. As these 
examples indicate the legislation has proved to be malleable for the government of the day, 
therefore how should those called upon to assess whether measures enacted pursuant to it are 
in fact consistent and systematic? 
 
IVb. Granting Market Access 
Market access, in terms of the award of licences or other forms of authorisation, frequently 
occurs either through ministerial discretion or via the authority vested in an independent 
regulatory authority. As witnessed above, the award of licences for betting in the Netherlands 
follows the former approach with there being no systematic process for potential new 
operators to gain access to the licensing procedure as the existing licence of an incumbent 
nears its expiry date.
112
 Similarly, as became evident in Engelmann the organisation of casino 
gambling in Austria relies upon ministerial discretion in granting market access; an 
administrative order in 1991 granted one undertaking a number of concessions for the 
operation of casinos for a maximum period of 15 years. When a portion of those concessions 
were renewed in 1998, and another portion in 2001, no tender procedure was utilised. 
Likewise, the granting of authorisation for casino operators in France rests with the Ministry 
of the Interior upon advice of the Commission supérieure des Jeux. The modus operandi of 
the commission has led to considerable criticism, in part surrounding the lack of transparency 
of the advice it provides to the Ministry of the Interior.
113
 There is no duty for the reasons 
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behind negative advice to be published, and thus depriving would be market operators, within 
and beyond France, from valuable information concerning their application and thus 
indirectly the assessment process.  
 Other Member States however rely upon a more open and transparent market access 
mechanisms, such as that embodied by the Gambling Act 2005 in the United Kingdom.
114
 
Apart from casinos for which there is an upper limit of on the number large and small casinos 
for which licences can be awarded,
115
 the total number of operating and where appropriate 
premise, licences is only limited by the discretion of the Gambling Commission in giving 
effect to the licensing objectives.
116
  Absent of any limited number of licences there is no 
danger of the market being foreclosed because the single or one of a few licences has been 
awarded. The Gambling Commission regulates the entry of suppliers to the market, both 
domestic and those established elsewhere through the operating licence, the forms for which 
are readily available on the Gambling Commission‟s website. Guidance notes stipulate what 
the Commission “expects from applicants for licences” whilst detailing the factors against 
which an application will be processed.
117
 These include the identity and ownership of the 
undertaking, the integrity of the applicant, their competence and any criminal record. In 
contrast with other regulatory regimes the publication of the grounds upon which the 
Commission exercises its discretion are to be welcomed, as is the indication given in the 
Commission‟s policy statement concerning, in part, how it will exercise its discretion in 
licensing matters.
118
 This policy statement provides some insight into how the Commission 
will consider the aforementioned factors and moreover indicates that the Commission will 
inform an applicant of the decision. Should an application be refused then “the licence 
applicant will be given the opportunity to make representations before that decision is 
finalised”.119 In the case it is necessary, appeals can be lodged before the Gambling Appeal 
Tribunal. Whilst it remains beyond the scope of this section to also consider the manner in 
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which local licensing authorities consider applications for premises licences this particular 
aspect of the Gambling Commission‟s work marks a considerable contrast to the opaque 
nature of the mechanisms referred to in relation to Austria, France and the Netherlands. 
 
IVc. Obligations, Supervision and Enforcement 
Once market access has been granted, presumably an operator will have conditions which it 
has to abide by. Where such conditions are to designed to give effect to restrictions to the free 
movement principles it is imperative that compliance with those conditions is effectively 
enforced. In the absence of such enforcement it could be argued that the regulation of the 
supplier is not aligned with the regulatory objectives which are used to restrict the entry of 
services and suppliers in other Member States. Indeed, the Court has guided the national court 
in Ladbrokes to consider whether there is effective supervision of the operator concerned 
regarding the expansion of new games in terms of advertising and the creation of new games 
so as to “reconcile appropriately the simultaneous achievement of the objectives pursued by 
the national legislation”.120 The other objective being the protection of consumers against 
excessive gambling. 
 Working through Ladbrokes it becomes evident that information is needed as to the 
conditions which uphold these objectives and the enforcement by the relevant ministerial 
bodies of those conditions. The WoK vests in the Ministers the competence to set conditions 
relating the provision of sports-betting services, which are spelt out in detail in the licence 
awarded to the operator. Little detail is provided in relation to sports-betting with broad 
references to the „total number of contests‟.121 Similarly, the same approach is taken in 
relation to the totalisator for horserace betting, which refers for example to the maximum 
number of races and the maximum bet per person.
122
 Such details are only given greater body 
once the licence has been awarded, for example the current authorisation for the provision of 
sport-betting provides for a maximum of 400 contests per year, with no bet being greater than 
€22,69 and maximum limits on the amounts individual players can loose per week.123 Such 
operating conditions are thus only known once the licence has been awarded given that they 
are contained within the licence. This contrasts to those which are contained within the 
licence conditions and codes of practice pursuant to the Gambling Act 2005. 
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 As the following example illustrates in relation to sports-betting, the British regime 
places greater emphasis on the discretion of the operator. Rather than describing limits as to 
amounts which can be staked, the conditions attached to general betting operating licences 
require that an operator who offers credit to member of the public “set a maximum credit limit 
for each customer”.124 Clearly this offers a different level of protection than setting a ceiling 
which above which no more losses can be sustained by a customer; but differences in national 
levels of protection are not of relevance in this instance. On the contrary, the transparency of 
conditions which operators must abide by in question, and as such this condition and many 
others are made available in advance of the granting of licence in contrast with the situation in 
the Netherlands. 
 Once an operator is installed, it is pertinent that there are supervisory and enforcement 
mechanisms in place, and once again this is an area lacking in transparency as to the 
functioning of such processes. Whilst the Minister of Justice in the Netherlands awards 
authorisation for gambling services in cooperation with another Minister depending on the 
sector for which authorisation is granted, advice is provided by the College van Toezicht as to 
whether authorisation should in fact be awarded, and subsequently whether it should be 
modified or repealed.
125
 What is of real interest is the role of this body in supervising the 
licence holders to ensure that they abide by the conditions and contained within the law, and 
their statues and rules. Although the College van Toezicht has been described as a “toothless 
watchdog”,126 and will be replaced by an independent authority, the supervisory mechanism 
which it embodies remains of interest.
127
 Remaining with the sports-betting sector, the annual 
reports of the College van Toezicht indicate that deliberations occurred within the supervisory 
body examining possible breaches by the incumbent operator of the conditions to which it 
must adhere.
128
 Only the decision is given, with some limited reasoning given but the actual 
parameters used by the members of the College van Toezicht remain invisible. Ultimately 
however the decision of whether any enforcement measures should be taken rest with the 
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Ministry of Justice and yet in terms of transparency this process remains something of a black 
box. 
 In contrast the Gambling Commission the United Kingdom offers some insight into 
how it supervises and enforces licensees with reference once again being made to its 
Licensing, compliance and enforcement policy statement. Under the headings of 
„compliance‟, „regulatory enforcement‟ and „investigation and prosecution of offences under 
the Gambling Act 2005‟ the Gambling Commission sets out the nature of its supervisory and 
enforcement activities and how it seeks to execute these tasks. For example, when carrying 
out compliance assessments and visits the Commission states that it will “explain what 
information is required, and why, to ensure requests are appropriate, proportionate… and 
enable the relevant person to comply fully with the request”.129 In relation to regulatory 
enforcement activities the Commission is empowered to conduct licence reviews through 
which it considers the performance of licence holders and the operation of licence 
conditions.
130
 The policy statement establishes the framework by which the Commission is to 
adhere including the opportunity for discussion with the licence holder under review, how the 
Commission will assess suitability and whether licensed activities are being carried out in a 
manner inconsistent with the licensing objectives and the forms of action which the 
Commission is empowered to take. Although this policy statement may not be exhaustive in 
the points which it includes and does not shed light on how the Commission will assess 
whether licence holders are “honest and open” as part of the integrity assessment, it 






Within the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services it has been noted that “a 
requirement to disclose the objective of a regulation is implicit in any provision that requires 
that a domestic regulation be the least trade-restrictive means necessary to achieve a 
regulatory purpose”.132 Arguably, this will apply in the context of the application of the 
consistent and systematic requirement as an element of the proportionality test under Article 
56 TFEU. Moreover, given the nature of this requirement, and how the Court has 
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subsequently operationalized the application of this concept first developed in Gambelli it 
would appear that this implicit requirement to disclose extends far deeper into the regulatory 
regime. As such transparency takes on a far greater life than suggested by the obligation of 
transparency in terms of awarding licences and concessions. Yet concurrently the margin of 
discretion to set regulatory objectives and standards has remained protected, thus showing 
how the need for regulatory transparency has crept into the regulation of national gambling 
markets as a means to keep a check on the exercise of the national regulatory competence in 
this field. 
 Furthermore although a pan-European gambling market based on unconditional 
mutual recognition has been dismissed by the Court, if it was ever a realistic prospect, does 
not mean that recognition of regulatory equivalence between regulatory regimes where 
monopolies do not prevail has been wholly foreclosed. The establishment of regulatory 
equivalence would require that regulatory authorities share information with each other 
regarding the objectives and mechanisms which form the basis of their regulatory regimes. 
Ultimately the case-law of the Court allows national regulatory authorities the capacity to 
share such information, and moreover political signals from Brussels recognise the 
importance of cooperation between regulatory authorities. Having noted that a need exists for 
Member States to “effectively regulate” gambling services the European Council recognises 
the need for regulatory authorities to “work more closely together”, with possible areas of  
cooperation including the sharing of information on gambling operators and the protection of 
consumers.
133
 This is in addition to the Council having identified the allocation of gambling 
licences, where applicable, as a task of such authorities which should be undertaken in 
accordance with transparent criteria. Such political findings echo the judicial pressure which 
has emerged for transparency in the regulation of gambling.  
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